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Economics: The Logic & Scientific Distortion  
 
How do we grow an economy? A former research director at the Federal Reserve who wished to 
remain anonymous commented about the credibility of economic forecasting: “If central bankers threw 
out all the data that was poorly measured, there would be very little information left on which to base 
their decisions".i However, are not we to believe that central bankers are smarter than to use 
unreliable data?  In fact, The Federal Reserve, America’s central bank, is comprised of people from the 
most prestigious universities of the world. Indeed, intellectual as they are, there is little debate that the 
scholars running the Federal Reserve have forecasted horribly inaccurate predictions in the approach of 
and during our most recent economic crises.  To illustrate how poorly they have done, one may look 
towards the two most recent chairpersons that headed the pseudo public institution: Alan Greenspan & 
Ben Bernanke.  Not only did both chairpersons inaccurately forecast the direction and impact of the 
housing bubble on the US economy, both acted as cheerleaders to expand the bubble itself. In 2006, 
Greenspan encouraged lenders to actually further expand adjustable rate mortgages in the subprime 
marketii while Bernanke concurred claiming the housing “boom” was an indicator of solid fundamentals 
of the US economy iii(Page 6). What could account for both these chairpersons’ mistaken forecasts? 
The principle behind Bernanke’s seemingly distorted claim of “solid (economic) fundamentals” 
resulted in wealth representing nothing but inflated paper values on depreciating assets.  Highlighting 
the question, ‘What are the fundamentals of a strong economy?’ Current policy, illustrated by Chairmen 
Ben Bernanke and Alan Greenspan pointed to the government and Federal Reserve data on GDP, 
personal income, and discretionary consumer spendingiv.  One can argue that Ben Bernanke made his 
statement based on intellectual dishonestyv.  However, a much more realistic and fair conclusion should 
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be that Ben Bernanke’s statements were not derived from corruption, but from a school of thought 
which modern economics has erroneously accepted.  Ben Bernanke and Alan Greenspan both derive 
their principles from a school that has evolved the role of central banks. The school has expanded their 
discretionary power over the economy through a 20th century through policy shifts. This brings forth 
questioning the theories that central bankers use to guide the economy through booms and busts. In 
fact, economic theory today appears to have countless amounts of theories, but one must look upon the 
logic of an economist’s fundamentals explain the unrelenting rise of the central bank’s power. We move 
analysis down to the level that questions the simple concepts of “wealth” and “thought” to obtain links 
in the modern theory.  In doing so, we illustrate the central divide among contemporary economists.  
Fundamentally, the prime rift is between economists who use deductive reasoning and those who use 
positive empirical evidence. To illuminate the effect of this rift, this article will disseminate a couple 
fundamental economic topics under scrutiny: Defining Growth and Forecasting. The resulting 
differences and history shows strong support for consideration of deductive reasoning over current 
methodology. The reality is that legitimate theories should channel central debate on the current 
“given” modern theory is not debated at all, but instead a mainstream economists insist a “bridge” 
exists today, known as the Neoclassical Synthesis of the 20th century. This has perverted economic 
thought to the point where debate will not even come under consideration on the fundamental level. 
Therefore, the Positive Empiricism Approach (See: “scientific”) has inherited a foundation built upon, 
ironically, a normative nature. Failure of the scientific approach, empirically and logically, proves that 
mainstream neo-Keynesian economics promotes externalities in waves that deliver far more impact 
than simply direct practice. The school's influence and has potential to be more destructive potential 
than any time in history.   
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The Participants of Philosophical Thrift 
 
The fundamental rift that questions the formulation of fundamental economic theory returns to 
a historically unsettled intellectual debate.  Very recently, there has been a resurgence of heterodox 
schools of economic thought, due mostly to the failure of mainstream economists to successfully 
forecast, or even clue the nation, on the financial crisis of 2008.  Nevertheless, before detailing the 
mainstream theory, I would like to elaborate on a particular heterodox economic philosophy, Austrian 
School of Economics. This school is important as the centerpiece for debate as they boast often about 
the plethora of economists who successfully predicted the 2008 crisis.vi The Austrian School, itself, was 
not a stranger to popularity in the past.  In fact, Austrian economics from the 1880s until the 1930s held 
worldwide-accredited stature and was the pretense of many policy decisions throughout Europe and the 
United States.  Austrian Economics uses the basis of Classical Economics of Adam Smith where they use 
methods of deriving logic in a similar fashion to Aristotle, Socrates, and Platovii.  Austrian Economists 
were one of the three schools that derived the logic of marginalization and founded the subjectivist 
approach in economics.  To get a better understanding of how they thought, Austrian economist Carl 
Menger introduced the term “Neoclassical economist” to distinguish the positive approach versus the 
subjective approach of marginalization along with separating the Austrian School with the often-
overlapping views of what we define as Alfred Marshall’s neoclassical schoolviii.  Among important 
historical events, Austrian economists gauged a famous intellectual war in the 1880s against scientific 
methods advocated by economists at the German Historical School, foreshadowing the very same 
fundamental argument happening today.  The epistemological debate highlighted that academics of 
the Austrian school, unlike both Neoclassicists and Empiricists, never infer that there are perfectly stable 
functioning markets. Therefore this view rejects the plausibility of perfect competition, highlighted the 
rapidly changing behavior of human preferences and behavior. ix 
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Now, flash forward to today.  Have you heard dissent or debate philosophical selection 
professors should teach to their students in their ‘Introduction to Macroeconomics’ classes? In nearly all 
schools, the neoclassical theory of perfect competition and perfectly clearing markets is taken as given 
and contrasted only with Keynesians’ view of “sticky prices”.  Similarly, text books also take as given  the 
integration of the ideas encompassed in General Theory (released by populist Maynard Keynes), which is 
the foundation of “aggregate demand” models in the classroom. Paul Samuelson together coined these 
two integrated theories as the “neoclassical synthesis”. x This is extremely important because this 
synthesis occurred during the time in which Richard Nixon made the apparently obnoxious, but 
surprisingly accurate statement, of the Federal Government’s shared economic ideology.  Nixon 
claimed, “We’re all Keynesians now”.  This did and still does portray shared massive acceptance of this 
economic ideology. To illustrate this, take “alternative” mainstream economic theories, such as 
Monetarism. Milton Friedman’s school of thought, often seen as contrasting Keynes, was forced to 
accept the general foundation of Keynesian economics to all be true.xi In fact, Friedman’s view of 
Keynesianism was little more [than] a moderate view on the principalsxii.  Others, in order to be able to 
attain prestigious positions, realigned their views to be in line with Keynesians.  This twist is best 
encompassed by the story of former Chairman Alan Greenspan wrote a famous 1966 essay in Ayn 
Rand’s novel supporting Austrian Economics; however, he switched his views into what is considered 
“monetarist” before he was able to enter the Federal Reserve and eventually to be elected chairmanxiii.  
In 2009, Newsweek commented on the current conundrum of the irrelevancy political ideology plays on 
economic ideology, it stated that all government was conducting exponentially increasing Keynesianism 
policies of expanding the size federal government and running constant account deficitsxiv.  This 
shortsighted view on history eventually led to a false economic divide between “conservative” 
economists who want to cut fiscal taxing, raise spending, and “liberal” economists who absolutely want 
more taxing and spending. Yet, both conservative and liberal economists share these following 
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characteristics: continuous expansion of the money supply, depreciating the dollar, discouraging 
savings, and encouraging spending.  All of these are roots to the fundamental Keynesian philosophy. 
The Fundamentals 
  
 Everywhere one looks, an 
onslaught of Keynesianism has forced 
scholars to accept the neoclassical 
synthesis into one’s philosophy if they are 
ever to enter the field of economics. That 
is not an overstatement, as every 
developed nation has now accepted 
Keynesian principals to some form and 
degree.  To provide an example—if one believes that the GDP is a good indicator of current economic 
standing, status, wealth, or growth, one follows the principles of Keynesianism. This is the first economic 
fundamental that the United States has universally accepted—but has this merited? 
 What is the definition of economic growth?  How do we know if we are growing today? One 
may look towards the heterodox schools to answer this question: Austrians and classicalist challenge 
fundamental validity of GDP. Austrians see GDP as a poor economic indicator for economic growth 
pointing that only investment leads to growth. The theory reason that spending comes as a result from 
past economic investment, and therefore an economy based 72% of GDP on spending is drastically 
misrepresenting growthxv. GDP derivation is found through calculating the summation of all 
expenditures by the nation. This includes consumer spending, domestic investment + the difference of 
Keynes’ flow of funds 
Flow of Funds 1 
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exports and imports, and government expenditures (GDPNominal=C+I+G+NX).  One can see how using 
deductive reasoning would lead to the conclusion GDP is a poor indicator. The deductive reasoning takes 
on the assumptions of GDP: a dollar spent, no matter on who or what, is equally as valuable as any other 
dollar. To illustrate the conclusion, we use the Classical/Austrian Aristotle method to derive the steps on 
the spending component of GDP; we then contrast it with Keynesian method and their conclusion: 
 Deductive Reasoning: Austrian Logic Testing GDP’s validity: 
1. Premise 1: Any expenditure that leads to future income is more desirable than waste 
(Prudency is desirable for future growth). 
2. Premise 2: Two people decide to start an economy in a new nation.  
3. Those two people have $100 dollars each. 
4. Premise 3: Person ‘A’ spent decided to offer a service sector selling alcohols. However, 
Person A is a drunk and spent his $100 on getting drunk. 
5. Person B spent $100 investing in a new business that focuses on producing planes and 
exporting them; whereby he hires 15 more people in the following year. 
6. Both $100 purchases, and therefore both people, have contributed to the wealth and 
growth of society equally. 
7. However, that leads to a contradiction.  
8. Therefore, either future income is neither more desirable than waste or the allocation 
prudency of your investment is more valuable depending on where it is placed. 
Some economists, such as various members of the Chicago school, maintain that GDP should 
account for this difference over a period of timexvi; with the person B in the situation above reducing his 
contribution to GDP to zero the following year.xvii However, Austrian theory accepts this but also that 
nature shows how GDP is a poor indicator for future growth. Nevertheless, Bernanke boldly proclaimed 
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back in In July 2006 & 2007 that the current numbers he held all the way through 2007 annual year 
would amount into promising future growth. 
The fiscal year of 2006 had no apparent shortcomings that were beyond the reach of monetary 
policy. That was the economic image portrayed in Ben Bernanke’s July 2006 Congressional address.  
There was not one mention of the 100-year low savings rate, instead we hear about very optimistic 
forecast and encouraging investors, borrowers, and homeowners. 
“This scenario envisions that consumer spending, supported 
by rising incomes and the recent decline in energy prices, will 
continue to grow near its trend rate and that the drag on the 
economy from the [inaudible] housing sector will gradually 
diminish… xviii 
 
Although 2007 was not foreshadowing a breakdown in the subprime market, Bernanke 12 
months later went even bolder and was convinced that subprime could never leak into the entire 
mortgage market. The $150 oil is also positive, although consumers may find it bothersome; 
Bernanke held that was clearly a sign for higher wages to come: 
“Sales should ultimately be supported by growth in income 
and employment, the global economy continues to be strong, 
supported by solid economic growth abroad... U.S. exports should 
expand further in coming quarters. Overall, the U.S. economy 
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seems likely to expand at a moderate pace over the second half of 
2007, with growth then strengthening a bit in 2008” xix 
Therefore, Bernanke cited “Sales”, which could be represented debt spending by ‘Person A’, as 
support for his forecast for 2008, instead we can conclude Bernanke used a method closer to Keynes in 
deriving his conclusion: 
 
The classic Keynes method of the same situation in the scenario outlined below: 
 
This is a simplification of Keynes model.  In contrast to the logical approach utilized by deductive 
reasoning, Keynes utilizes his theory that prices remain sticky in the short run. These ‘sticky’ prices 
illustrate a clear motivation when illustrated. The figure above displays how the government can print 
money and pour it into any of spending—which must shift the equilibrium from the left line to an 
increase of 200 (the GDP). Therefore, the Keynesian approach clearly has political implications by 
making numerous unsupported assertions about money and wealth. Bernanke’s forecast makes these 
underlying assumptions above: Assuming that today’s spending is an indication of future economic 
output (as the model shifts on a flat SRAS, the new GDP has shifted rightwards and should be followed 
GROWTH 100+100=200 
Aggregate Demand increase on SRAS P 
 
Y 
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by a shift in LRAS). These assumptions highlight the fundamental Austrian school’s criticisms of 
Keynesian growth. Austrians contend that the Keynesian approach on growth focused solely around the 
“Aggregate Demand” model, which does not account for negative effects of inflation, the level of debt, 
and portrayal of governmental expenditures. Inflation, Austrians contend, that will result from printing 
money shifts this curve to the right but does not portray the overall loss in purchasing power. Similarly, 
Government spending is criticized for being “double counted” being counted for income earned and 
afterwards when government spends (Austrians argue it should actually be subtracted from GDP). 
Finally, the model does not account for debt levels, which is sacrificing future spending for spending 
today (thereby having a reverse effect later) and should be subtracted in the model.   
Criticism of both the model of Aggregate demand and the inherent GDP measure are flawed and 
therefore invalid for forecasting is and always will be old. The creator of the GDP measure, Simon 
Kuznets, declared in 1934 that GDP “should not be used” for forecasting and is not an indicator of any 
type of welfarexx.  Despite these stern warnings, GDP has instead been widely adopted as prime 
measures of economic health and indicator for future standards of livingxxi. President George Bush 
equated “patriotism” to “shopping.”xxii In addition, the United States now defines recessions in terms of 
negative GDP.  However, it is not as if there were not any alternatives to using GDP. Austrian economist 
Murray Rothbard has proposed alternative methods for deriving a measure of economic welfare to 
replace GDP. Rothbard’s most popular measure was the PPR (Private Product Remaining) which 
attempted to address a few of these imbalances; but attention and attempts change adopt new 
measurements are viewed as ‘fringe’ and largely ignored. xxiii 
 There is a definition for “economic growth” that nearly all economists will grant validity 
towards. Perhaps difficult or even impossible to empirically measure, this classic definition of economic 
growth is the “expansion of productive capacity” of an economy. Nevertheless, we observed a 
perplexing attention to aggregate demand in the 20th century. The attention towards aggregate demand 
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is a modern phenomenon preceding the existence Keynesian theory. Notable friend of Keynes, Friedrich 
Hayek of the Austrian school, commented on in a television interview that concentration on aggregate 
demand was not a new concept and economists “knew to no longer pretend that aggregate demand 
would expand productive capacity”.  Hayek also elaborated about phenomena surrounding the 
attention to Keynes theories of aggregate demand. Disappointed that modern economists (of the 50s-
70s) ignored history, Hayek claimed aggregate demand   “was a primitive idea which had clearly been 
refuted”.  Hayek went on to quote the “fundamental mistake” Leslie Steven commented upon of the 
1880s, “The classic mistake of a new economist is to be falsely led into looking at consumption spiral of 
demand”xxiv.  It is important to point out that Hayek predicted the Great Depression in 1929, just before 
the stock market bubble burst on the grounds what he claimed was an excess of lending, deficiency in 
savings and current “misallocation of resources”.xxv In contrast, Keynes failed to predict the depression 
completely; but his views still win out in policy.  Bush’s comment on patriotic spending, consumption 
spending was 72% of our economy in 2007. Finally as illustrated in by quotations of the current 
Chairman, the Federal Reserve adopted acceptance that spending would lead to future employment and 
growthxxvi.  Yet, false forecasts have put Bernanke’s credibility into question, but the very processes 
behind the neo-synthesis forecasting methods and their fundamentals have failed to be questioned on 
their fundamental methods. 
 Which leads us to the second fundamental rift: Does anyone know exactly how to predict 
booms, recessions and employment?  As mentioned before, Ben Bernanke, Alan Greenspan, Secretary 
Paulson, and Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman have all stated that housing prices ‘appreciating’ was 
‘wealth’, a signal of growth, indication of strong fundamentals, and or a form of the economy growing.  
Nevertheless, Austrian economists Jim Rogers (2005), Michael Pento (2006), Peter Schiff (2005), and 
even Ron Paul (2003) said that housing speculation was consistent with the Austrian Business Cycle 
theory, where all proclaimed that malinvestment in housing is a bubble that will end in a recession. The 
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Austrian Business Cycle method is not to be confused with “Real Business Cycle Theory”. The Austrian 
Business Cycle proclaims malinvestment is encouraged through some false signal in the economy. xxvii 
This theory has had an impressive history that deserves further attention. We see that a few modern 
Austrian economists foresaw the crisis years before the housing bubble collapsed, but this is reminiscent 
of Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig Von Mises leading up to the Great Depressionxxviii. That is correct; as early 
as 1924, Ludwig predicted the global depression and meant it—famously rejecting an executive position 
at a large bank, citing he wanted “no part in their impending failure” (which collapsed only 4 months 
later).xxix Similarly, Hayek famously predicted in 1929 that the ongoing recession in Europe would 
continue until the stock market bubble and credit boom collapsed. Von Mises commented on how he 
foresaw the depression:  Lew Rockwell, the founder of the Von Mises Institute; spoke on Mises 
foresight: 
From 1926 to 1929, the attention of the world was chiefly 
focused upon the question of American prosperity. As in all 
previous booms brought about by expansion of credit, it was then 
believed that the prosperity would last forever, and the warnings 
of the economists were disregarded. The turn of the tide in 1929 
and the subsequent severe economic crisis were not a surprise 
for [Austrian] economists; they had foreseen them, even if they 
had not been able to predict the exact date of their occurrence.xxx 
 
Moreover, the Nobel Committee elaborated Hayek’s Predictions: 
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 Perhaps, partly due to this more profound analysis, he 
was one of the few economists who gave warning of the 
possibility of a major economic crisis before the great crash 
came in the autumn of 1929.  Both Von Mises and Hayek 
illustrated how monetary expansion, accompanied by lending 
which exceeded the rate of voluntary saving, could lead to a 
misallocation of resources, particularly affecting the structure of 
capital. This type of business cycle theory with links to monetary 
expansion has fundamental features in common with the 
postwar monetary discussionxxxi. 
 
Therefore, Austrians consistently predicted and explained both the Great Depression along with the 
current economic collapse with the Austrian Business Cycle theory. Keynes and Irving Fisher (the famous 
neo-classical economist at the time) failed at predicting the Great Depression completely. Alas, the 
Depression did not lead to a rise of the Austrians, but a policy adoption of the 1930s by those who failed 
to predict the Great Depression. 
A similar picture seems to mirror the current collapse and recession. Even if an economist 
vehemently disagrees with the Austrian’s theories on business and government, virtually every 
economist has agreed America had a problem excessive debt that contributed to the collapse of the 
bubble.  Therefore, following basic laws of any logic, the solution proposed should include the same 
factors that caused the crisis. In 1946, six weeks before his death, Lessons learned by John Maynard 
Keynes made him concede his own mistakes in the belief in the Phillips curve and deficit-financingxxxii 
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However, Keynesian philosophy had spread so far and deep that Keynes himself became irrelevant and 
only the General Theory followed. The primary example of today’s policy is illustrated by Chairman 
Bernanke, who vehemently recommended fiscal stimulus in combination with the unrelenting amount 
of inflation printing. Unfortunately, there even exist some want to extend Keynesian policy even further. 
Paul Krugman asserted that Bernanke’s position is far too ‘conservative’, despite Bernanke’s current 
policy of record low interest rates, rates of lending, and asset purchases. 
 How could Krugman consider a plan with all-time records in money printing and expansion of 
money supply be considered moderate by Krugman? Keynesians like Krugman will justify their 
advocating policies by pointing to a theory modeling the relationship between money supply, fiscal 
spending and GDP, which elaborates on the aggregate demand model, known as the IS/LM model. This 
IS/LM relationship says  increasing the money supply and fiscal stimulus both simultaneously will 
increase GDP while holding interest rates constant—therefore standards of living of everyone (Note 
Milton Friedman’s preferred method is also illustrated by the LM; observe how the theory builds from 
Keynesianism, not against). We then model again the approaches to solve and fix the crises of 2008 and 
the current recession of today: 
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Austrian Deductive Solution to crises: 
1. Premise One: The Federal Reserve along with government agencies created 
environment of falsified signals to the market.  
2. Premise Two: The Government (represented by deficits) and the people have 
spent far too much money and have far too much debt. 
3. Step One: Bubble: The false signals led to malinvestment in the economy & 
excess credit supplied blew up the bubble. 
4. Step Two: Crash: Once the malinvestment was recognized, the prevailing 
market forces will attempt to correct the misallocation of resources. 
Moreover, correct interest rate levels.  Recession and economic contraction 
must come. 
5. Step Three: Market and Consumer Rebalancing: The consumer who went into 
too much debt to will eventually correct his behavior and start saving again as 
rising interest rates will lower the cost of holding money. 
6. Conclusion: No stimulus, allow Creative Destruction. Monetary stimulus will 
only inflate the currency and suppress interest rates further slowing 
correction and lengthening the recession. Fiscal Stimulus will further 
government debt and raise burden on citizens to repay the government’s 
debt.    
Keynesian  Solution 
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What we can draw from the two approaches is one agreement: both accept the model will change 
the markets by influencing nominal interest rate, but instead of “growth” being the likely forecast, 
Austrians argue that this is an example of the false signals sent to free market. Deductive reasoning 
would therefore say the IS/LM stimulus example t should be avoided by the nature of deductive logic. 
Keynesians however argue that the model is reality and will only lead to the effects of what it illustrated 
on the model: Future Growth and higher output. If Keynesians had to use deductive logic as a pretense 
to applying their models in practice, we would see far less stimulating today.  Dr. Nassim Taleb of New 
York University summed up current economic thought process by those who control monetary and fiscal 
policy, “Economists are taking far too many risks today”.   He further elaborated, “Economists like 
Bernanke, Greenspan, and Krugman have been looking for ways to fit data to match their models, rather 
than adjusting their models to match the actual data”.xxxiii   
 To conclude, I bring up forward the reader to consider the following: can you convince yourself 
there is justification for the fringe status of Austrian economics? If not, why not permit them from 
attaining positions within any major position on the board of governors and or the FOMC.  Is the Federal 
Reserve or the \ Treasury of the United States?  We identified the fundamental separation between 
deductive reasoning and empirical modeling. Yet with the historic record of accurate predictions in the 
deductive reasoning school of thought, combined with the recent failure of current neo-synthesis 
policies in practice, we must accept it is far more logical to allow the chance for competing schools of 
thought to debate with the mainstream ideas. Allowing Austrians a few positions at either the Federal 
Reserve’s Board of Governors or the United States treasury enables the chance to debate the 
mainstream economists and make them prove their theories at the FOMC or Congress. Granting any 
heterodox school the chance to integrate with the mainstream will, at worst, give those who have not 
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been exposed consider alternatives to mainstream theory and to better understand alternative school 
methods and lead to real economic debate that is long overdue. Alas, consider the possibility that these 
debates could lead to innovation methods to come up with new and functioning monetary policy. 
Perhaps we can begin to undo the damage of modeling assumptions and fundamentally return 
education that has not been considered in 70 years. Keynesian & neo-synthesis suppression on 
alternative methodology is not benefitting intellectual honesty or current economic standards of living. 
Allowing the necessary debate may help prevent our future economy from blowing up serious bubbles 
and lead the nation to serious path of sustainable prosperity. Unless you can convince yourself this is a 
bad thing for the current state of economics; help spread the case for a real debate. 
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